A lot is said about Vladimir Putin, but few truly understand the man behind the image. I won’t pretend to know “Vova” personally, but I do have a deeper perspective than most. As many of you know, I was born in Georgia—a nation closely linked to Russia by both culture and history. Georgians and Russians have shared deep historical ties, and many Georgians speak Russian fluently. Similarly, most Russians are familiar with Georgian traditions and have a great understanding of the Georgian language. Although I’ve lived in the United States for many years and proudly consider myself a patriotic American, I hold citizenship of only one country—the United States of America—unlike some members of Congress who are Dual citizens of a certain non-friendly country. Still, I’ve been fortunate to have perspective of Eastern Europe, which have given me a deeper understanding of its people and culture.
The war/conflict When Saakashvili, started a war with Russia. Make no mistake—He started it. Even though the western world blame Russia. In 2008, even Reutersreported that Georgia started the war. I was in Georgia at the time, I was young still in high school. I remember everything. The news channels were so corrupt that we didn’t even know a full blown war had started until the last moments. Soldiers were dying on the front lines - while people in the cities were attending concerts and throwing parties, unaware of what was really happening near the Ossetian borders. They were playing it as a minor conflict until it was almost impossible to hide the server situation on the frontlines that’s because Saakasvili owned media and he did not want the severity of the conflict getting out to Georgian public. It took Russians 5 days onlt and they were already bombing Gori - One big city away from Tbilisi.
What’s the point of this story? The point is simple: the Russians chose to stop. They weren’t defeated. They weren’t pushed out. They had the power to take Gori and then Tbilisi, the capital—and they chose not to. Gori is one of the largest cities in Georgia.
Georgia is three times smaller than Ukraine and Russian army was not in shape it is today against Ukraine yet they managed to almost swallow us completely. No reasonable person would believe that Georgia could have stopped Russia from taking the entire country by force. With what? Their 24 old tanks? So why did Russia pull back? When they had advanced as far as Gori—Stalin’s birthplace and then—they withdrew. Why? Because Russia never intended to conquer Georgia. Their invasion was a signal, a warning: ‘’come to your senses, or face the consequences.’’ Can we really call it an invasion if Saakashvili started it? I call this you F**** around you Find out situation.
If Russia truly wanted to seize more territory or rebuild the Soviet Union, nothing could have stopped them there. Nothing stops them now. What could tiny Georgia have done—with twenty four tanks and a couple fighter jets to stand in their way? The idea is laughable. What Russia did is called - Mercy! They pulled back after teaching a good lesson to Europe that was out of control and is even more out of control today and to Georgian to stop manipulating and creating problems on Russian boarders. Russia has enough to worry about inside its own country. They have one of the most complex geopolitical situation in the world. They don’t need extra headaches.
They could have easily overthrown President Saakashvili, dragged him out of his palace—lavishly decorated by western money and built as a monument to himself—Russians could have executed a regime change on the spot. But they didn’t. They held back. They showed restraint, even knowing full well that Georgia’s leadership was heavily aligned with Western intelligence —essentially with a CIA asset in power. And when I say “CIA asset,” I mean it literally. Saakashvili had a handler—a former Navy admiral who was now a Dean in the university, Misha (Saakashvili) and his handler had several meetings in New York, all caught on camera by a private detective. That same handler was closely connected to Senator John McCain.
In fact, during the McCain vs. Obama presidential race, Misha’s party members in all their ridiculousness, drove around in a car in Georgia with a license plate that read - McCain to show his support to his Daddy I guess. Let me remind you: this man was the President of Georgia. That’s how much of a puppet he and his administration were. In August, Putin showed restraint. He withdrew his troops and allowed Saakashvili to stay in power. He said nothing when the entire Western world was bashing and F-wording him—quite literally. His real victory came when Ukraine elected Viktor Yanukovych as president. That alone was enough for Putin to feel that his borders were somewhat safe. I remember Yanukovych’s elections—I was in Ukraine, Kyiv, with my Ukrainian friends Lydmila and Yeraslava on their School tour.
I remember asking them how they felt about Yanukovych, to which both of them had the exact same thing to say: “We don’t like any of the candidates, but at least Yanukovych seems like someone who cares a little more about the country. The rest are corrupt to the core.” That was a common sentiment at the time—and it reflected why Yanukovych ended up with significant support. Many people voted for him, and his victory gave Russia a brief period of strategic breathing room. It was also a major setback for U.S. intelligence efforts. To be fair, this happened early in Barack Obama’s second year as president, during a time of major internal transitions. His administration was still focused on recovering from the 2008 financial crisis, while the U.S. remained deeply entangled in Iraq and Afghanistan.
In the meantime, Ukraine’s then-president, Ushenko—widely seen as a Western-backed figure—failed to deliver, he completely dropped the ball. I remember hearing people in both Ukraine and Georgia talk about how weak he was. And they were right. He was an ineffective leader, and in that vacuum of strength, Yanukovych managed to slip through despite tightly controlled Ukraine by the west. (After that Poroshonko was also weak and could last long - a total of 5 years.) When Yanukovych was elected that gave Russia a false sense of security—they believed Ukraine was no longer a big of a threat at their borders.
So they eased off, not fully but just enough and not just from Ukraine but from Georgia too, In hindsight, that was a major strategic mistake. But the CIA caught on quickly. They realized they needed another loyal figure in Ukraine. The problem was, Yanukovych had been democratically elected, and he wasn’t going anywhere—not yet.
The U.S. overplayed its hand by trying to run the exact same playbook in both Ukraine and Georgia. The strategy was so copy-paste, so transparent, that even a casual observer could see who was pulling the strings behind the scenes. Now, let’s get into the similarities between Zelensky and Saakashvili:
Let’s start with the Outsider Status. Both rose to power as anti-establishment figures, promising to break with entrenched corruption and oligarchic systems—in almost the same way. Zelensky was a comedian with no prior political experience. Saakashvili was a young, Western-educated reformer who came to power after the Rose Revolution in 2003.
Both ran on, and heavily campaigned for, anti-corruption platforms, vowing to modernize and clean up their states—often using almost identical rhetoric. Interestingly, Saakashvili actually joined Ukrainian politics later. He was appointed Governor of Odesa by President Poroshenko in 2015. Both men have Western educational backgrounds.But my favorite part is - the style. Have you ever noticed how Zelensky always wears green T-shirts or something super casual? That’s not random—it’s a strategy. They did the same thing with Saakashvili. Rarely would you see him in a suit, dressed like a traditional president. He always tried to appeal to the masses by dressing like an average person—even though his clothes were far from average: Balenciaga, Gucci, etc.
Even Enrique Iglesias noticed this during his visit to Georgia. He said, and I quote: —I like how you’re dressed like me - casual.
Here is a video:
Now, I don’t know how this came about—whether some CIA geniuses came up with it through psychological profiling and strategy, or whether Saakashvili was just too narcissistic to obey the usual rules about how a president should dress and behave. Maybe his handlers realized that it resonated well with Eastern European audiences and decided to reuse the strategy with Zelensky. Either way, I wouldn’t be surprised. But one thing is obvious: these two are like Mini and Moe.
After Ukrainian puppets failed one after another this is when they started prepping Saakashvili for a new potential role. One of his own former partners Nino Burjanadze even said: ‘Saakashvili has a new role to play in Ukraine for the West—he’s on a mission over there.’ Her words not mine.
I kid you not—if this were a Hollywood movie, people would criticize it as unrealistic. No former president would trade his passport for a new one just to become a governor in a different country. Imagine if Trump traded his American passport to become a prime minister or something in England. What is that? Simply ridiculous. But Saakashvili was instructed to do just that—and he did. Don’t forget, this is a man who removed the article on treason from the country’s constitution. Obviously, he knew he was going to commit exactly that. The article was only just reinstated by the current government. Then Saakashvili messed up Ukraine and aided the West in Maidan and then we all know what happened.
Anyway, after all this, we in the west started hearing Putin’s name everywhere. But hardly anyone really knew what they were talking about. The only reason I’ve decided to write about him—despite never knowing him personally—is because I grew up watching him, unlike most Americans I know a lot about him. I speak the language I grew up on Russian literature I understand them. So who is Vladimir Putin? Is he a monster, is he a good guy or is he like everyone else a little bit of both. During the war, I traveled to Russia. I already had my world shuttered by the truth from hating Putin and Russians I came to understand that I blamed them unjustly for a very long time.
During my time there, I had the opportunity to connect with some military officers. For a Westerner, they’re not exactly easy to reach, but for a Georgian, they’re far more accessible. So, I leveraged my Georgian roots to make it happen. When you’re born in Georgia, you can always find someone with strong ties to Russia. I found such a person and asked for a big favor—to help me get me into Russia and to help me get in touch with Military on the front lines, even if just for a couple of days. He made it happen. What was meant to be a few days in Russia turned into a month, and I had an unforgettable experience.
Friends I made in Russia were interesting. For the sake of privacy, I’ll call him Alexsey, though that’s not his real name. Once we grew close, he shared things with me about the war what happened in initial attack etc. and about Russia in general some I knew as a kid growing up in Georgia and some I had never heard before. I began to understand the tight control the Russian state exerts—not to justify it, but to see it in context much of it, I came to realize, was shaped by the West’s own actions toward Russia. I also found out how free Russians are much more than us in some way.
I learned that, despite their reputation for stoicism, Russians are deeply religious. I had always known they were religious, but I had never experienced it firsthand. I remember watching Alexsey doing push-ups; before starting, he would always turn his crucifix to hang on around his back so it wouldn’t touch the floor when his chest came down. That small gesture struck me—it was reverent, instinctual. I had never seen anything like it before. They are true believers. But when necessary, they can also be an angry bear.
That month was one of the highlights of my life. It gave me the chance to be there, to see things with my own eyes, to connect dots I didn’t even know existed. At first, it was painful—shattering, even—to watch everything I thought I knew collapse in front of me. I had to recognize how much I was bamboozled by the western propaganda and by my own bubble that I created around thoughts and ideas. But soon after, something else came: a sense of freedom. Gratitude. I had taken a step outside the Matrix we’re all trapped in—one most people will never even realize exists.
Now Russians are no angels, far from it they have lot of flaws, but they are certain nowhere near what the west says they are. Things you did not know about Putin. In this article, I will present all sides of Putin—the good and the bad—so that you can form your own opinion about him.
Putin was born on October 7th, 1952, in Leningrad, the youngest in the family of Vladimir Spiridonovich Putin and Maria Ivanovna Putina. His older brother died in infancy, another during the Leningrad Blockade from disease and starvation. Putin’s family personally endured significant hardship due to Nazism and World War II.
The Nazis killed his grandmother, his brother perished during the Leningrad Blockade and his father was wounded in the war. Putin, therefore, witnessed immense suffering because of the Nazis, which I believe partially explains why he later chose to have the relationship he had with Germany, studied its language, and maintained close ties with the country. It seems to be a mix of fate and subconscious desires.
As a young KGB officer, he was sent to Germany on a mission, but we’ll cover that part soon. He attended public school in Leningrad, and at the age of 12, he began taking SAMBO classes—a martial art developed in the Soviet Union. Given how often he mentions the sport, I’m sure it remains one of his favorite styles to this day. Putin was extremely smart he graduated with a law degree and later he got another degree in economics. In 1975, Putin joined the KGB. When he is trained enough to be transferred to first Directorate he starts monitoring foreigners and possible spies in the city. This taught him a lot about human behavior. Putin, as a politician, was shaped by one man: Anatoly Sobchak. Anatoly Sobchak gave Putin his very first political job. Let me tell you this story in context.
On November 9, 1989, the Berlin Wall fell. The Soviet Union was unraveling, and the streets of East Germany erupted with protest and unrest. For weeks, waves of demonstrators had been demanding change, and when the Wall finally came down, it ignited a new boldness in the people. Protesters began targeting government buildings—symbols of the regime’s power—including one particular building that housed the KGB.
Inside that KGB station, was a young officer named Vladimir Putin. As chaos engulfed the city, Putin’s superior officer, sensing the inevitable, hastily destroyed as many sensitive documents as he could before fleeing. But there wasn’t enough time to erase everything. When he left, he left Putin and another colleague to face the gathering storm alone. An angry crowd soon appeared in front of the building. In that moment, the two men inside had a choice: let the mob storm the building, potentially looting or burning it to the ground, or confront them—risking their own lives to defend their country’s secrets.
Putin made an interesting choice. He calmly stepped outside to face the crowd. Speaking fluent German, he addressed them with an eerie calm. “You are about to enter a government facility—illegally,” he said. “I am armed. I have a pistol with nine bullets. I may not be able to stop all of you, but I will certainly stop the first nine. The choice is yours.” The protesters backed off. That moment captures something essential about Vladimir Putin’s character: controlled, calculating, willing to risk everything for what he believes is his duty. But that was only the beginning of his story.
After returning to the Soviet Union/Russia from Germany, Putin found himself without a job. It was common practice at the time for former KGB officers to be placed in academic institutions when they had nothing else to do—often as professors or assistants. This practice, which still exists in various forms today (including in Western institutions like George Washington, Harvard and Yale), involves embedding intelligence personnel in universities. I believe this is a dangerous precedent—no matter where it happens—and a threat to the integrity of higher education and society at large in every country and this should not be allowed.
But back in the day, this practice was nothing out of the ordinary. After his initial KGB service, he ended up at Leningrad State University, where fate reconnected him with a former professor: Anatoly Sobchak. Sobchak, a widely respected legal scholar and reformist, welcomed his former student with warmth. He was, by all accounts, a good man—a true patriot who believed deeply in Russia’s future.
Their bond was quickly renewed. Sobchak, now preparing to run for mayor of Leningrad (soon to reclaim its historic name, St. Petersburg), invited Putin to join his campaign. Remarkably, it was Sobchak and Putin who were instrumental in restoring the city’s name—a symbolic step in reclaiming its pre-Soviet identity and leaving communism behind.
When Subchok asked Putin to join him, Putin hesitated at first. “I can’t,” he told him. “To be honest with you, Anatoly Alexandrovich, I’m an active intelligence officer. I don’t think I can legally do it.” Putin wanted to leave KGB but it was not up to him back then. Undeterred, Sobchak reached out to contacts he had in the government and requested that Putin be released from his duties. His request was granted. Putin joined the campaign.
In a documentary by Sobchak’s daughter, his widow recalls the deep friendship between the two men. “They were inseparable,” she said. “They went fishing together, worked side by side, trusted each other completely. ‘’I think your father found in Vladimir someone he could truly rely on’’ - She said. And she was right—if not for Putin, Anatoly would be dead.
Sobchak won the election, becoming the first democratically elected mayor of St. Petersburg. He proved to be a bold and visionary leader, launching reforms to rebuild the local economy and promote democratic governance. But this was the 1990s—a time when Russia, emerging from the collapse of the Soviet Union, became a playground for Western elites. These same forces were instrumental in creating the oligarch class that would dominate the country’s economy. Putin, at this time, remained far from the epicenter of power.
It was the oligarchs that inherited a new country and they were governed by the west and their own greed. Many of the newly empowered oligarchs were not concerned with Russia’s well-being at all. They pursued policies that aligned only with their own interests and with corporate interests—often foreign—rather than the nation’s. By the time Sobchak ran for a second term, the tides had turned. He lost the election. With that, he lost everything: his political office, his university position, and much of his public influence.
Sobchak was devastated. His wife and close friends described him as deeply disillusioned, watching as President Yeltsin’s regime drifted away from its democratic promises and into the grip of external manipulation. Determined to reconnect, Sobchak wrote a personal letter to Yeltsin. But he didn’t trust couriers, he did not trust his own connections. Instead, he gave the letter to a close friend, actress Sati Spivakova, and asked her to deliver it in person. He even told her to read it. He said: ‘’ please read it so you know what you are delivering to the president.’’
The letter was heartfelt:
‘Dear Boris Nikolaevich, remembering all our history together, I can only guess that someone is poisoning you against me. I don’t know who or what forces are doing this, but I want you to know I fully support you. I am ready to serve the country and contribute to its future. Please don’t believe those who wish harm upon Russia or its people’…
It was a plea not just for reconciliation, but for clarity and conscience. Yeltsin’s reply to Spivakova not to Sobchak. He said, “Tell him I feel for him, and I support him—but I speak only for myself, not for the administration.”
That simple statement revealed something chilling: that the President of Russia was no longer in full control. If not Yeltsin—then who was in power? Today we know that but back in the day it was hard to tell.
Despite Sobchak’s fall, Putin stayed loyal. He had learned a great deal under Sobchak—politics, governance, how power worked—and he wasn’t about to turn his back on the man who gave him a future. He continued working for the city administration, even after his mentor was ousted. He kept close ties to Sobchak. It was around this time that Anatoly Chubais, a powerful figure close to President Yeltsin, took notice of Putin.
Impressed by his work, Chubais offered him a position in Moscow. Putin accepted, but he never turned his back on Sobchak. In the dangerous Russian politics, in 1990s - losing power often meant more than a fall from grace—it could mean imprisonment or death. Especially for someone like Sobchak, a genuine democratic reformer. He (Sobchak) soon found himself the target of a criminal investigation.
The charges were bogus—manufactured by political enemies. Years later, even those who initiated the case would admit that it was entirely fabricated. But the damage was done. Sobchak and his family were deeply shaken.
Under the stress, Sobchok developed a heart condition and was hospitalized. Then, in 1997, prosecutors made their move. They were planning to arrest him as soon as he was discharged from the hospital. Putin was informed about this. He knew the charges were a farce. He knew this was a vendetta. And he decided to do something about this.
Years later, Boris Nemtsov—by then one of Putin’s most vocal opponents—recounted this remarkable episode in an interview. He said it was he who informed President Boris Yeltsin about Sobchak’s possible arrest and deteriorating condition and the legal case being prepared against him. — Certain forces in the legal system are preparing to arrest Anatoly Sobchak — Nemtsov told the president.
Yeltsin looked at him. “Arrest him? Why? Is he guilty?”
It was a revealing moment—Russia’s president, the supposed head of state, was out of the loop on a politically charged prosecution targeting one of the country’s most prominent reformers. Nemtsov could only shrug. “I don’t know. I suppose that’s for the court to decide.”
Yeltsin’s reply was both telling and tragic: “Tell those people it’s unethical to kick a man when he’s down.”
It was a classic Yeltsin move—registering disapproval without actually intervening which he could do any moment if he wanted to. He expressed his moral discomfort, but stopped short of action. Yeltsin was afraid. He knew full well that challenging the entrenched forces and outside power that were pulling the strings could land him in Sobchak’s place. The president of Russia no longer commanded the full machinery of power— He had become a hostage to it. Honestly, how could he know he was drunk every other day.
While Yeltsin looked away, Vladimir Putin did not. Putin—then still a relatively low-profile official—was never one to shy away from risk. In an operation worthy of a Cold War thriller, he orchestrated a covert evacuation of his former mentor out of Russia. The mission was dangerous, totally illegal, and entirely off the books
Putin approached Sobchak’s wife with a plan. He told her that he had a trusted contact in Paris—someone who could arrange medical treatment for Sobchak. But to pull it off, they needed to do a few things. Sobchok’s daughter, Ksenia, was about to turn sixteen. Putin advised Sobchak’s wife to plan an extravagant birthday celebration, something public, something that would require her husband’s attendance. She was to write a formal request to the hospital and the authorities, asking that her husband be temporarily released from hospital for the event and that despite his frail condition, arrangements had been made for medical transport so he could attend his daughter’s milestone birthday.
Of course, there was no intention for him to return home. Putin would handle the logistics. He had the right contacts, the right access, and enough to make it work. But the risks were enormous. If caught, it could mean the end of his career—or worse. He informed one trusted colleague in Moscow about the operation, someone he believed needed to know in case things went sideways.
He said: “I’m going to do this.’’ “Don’t tell Yeltsin. He’ll try to stop me. But I want you to know everything, in case something goes very wrong. If it does, you must tell the president that I had to do this.”
The colleague responded gravely: “If something goes wrong, I won’t be able to save you.”
But Putin went ahead anyway. He always had a streak of the daredevil in him. Sobchak was flown out of Russia and taken to France, where he received treatment and temporary refuge from the storm that had nearly destroyed him. Putin had done what the president of Russia would not: he saved a man, defied the system, and showed that he was willing to take enormous risks for those he loved and trusted. This showed Yeltsin that Putin was the only man he could have trusted with Russia.
The plan in motion: Sobchak’s wife knew the phones in their house were tapped. Every word could be overheard, every movement possibly monitored. Putin told her to use that and talk to her friends, to invite them and family to a birthday party. He told her to say that Anatoly would be released from the hospital for a day to attend their daughter Ksenia’s sixteenth birthday. It was a believable excuse.
Behind the scenes, Putin was orchestrating a delicate escape. He informed Sobchak’s wife that she, would have to make the contact with the French side. There needed to be a medical vehicle waiting at Le Bourget Airport in Paris, ready to transport Sobchak to the hospital. But to place the call securely, she would have to follow instructions—down to the smallest detail.
In her own words, she later recalled:
“Putin gave me detailed instructions on what to do. I kept nodding and saying I understood, but he would get a little embarrassed and insist, ‘Please repeat it back to me anyway.’ And so I did—again and again.”
Putin said:
“There’s an Air France ticket office on Bolshaya Morskaya, you can call Paris directly from there, but you can’t walk in openly—you’ll be followed. So here’s what you do — Go to the Tussardi boutique next door (Luxury outlet). Pick out a few dresses in your size. Head to the very back of the fitting room, as if you’re going to try them on. Then exit through the rear door—it faces the back entrance of the Air France ticket office. Once inside, find a specific employee, a young woman. Tell her you need to make a call to Paris. She’ll take you to an untapped phone. You’ll give the instructions. Then exit the same way, return to the store, buy the dresses, and go home.”
She followed every step exactly as Putin told her. She called Paris, and bought the dresses. The next day, the Russian newspapers exploded with headlines: “Sobchak is dying in hospital and his wife seen shopping in Saint Petersburg’s most expensive boutique.” The setup worked. The media took the bait.
Putin, operating outside any official chain of command, had just saved his mentor’s life. When President Yeltsin learned of the operation, he was quietly pleased. He hadn’t given the order, hadn’t taken the risk himself—but someone had done what he could not. And perhaps, in that moment, Yeltsin saw something in the younger man that Russia needed: boldness, loyalty, and a willingness to defy the system when the system turned on its own.
This, according to many, was the turning point—the moment Yeltsin began to consider Putin as his successor. The country was collapsing under the weight of corruption, Western exploitation, and oligarch control. Yeltsin knew he couldn’t hold it together. And in Putin, he saw the only man who might.
When Bill Clinton heard of Yeltsin’s intention, he was alarmed — “I’m worried about this young fella you’re putting in charge,” Clinton told him. It may have been said half in jest, but Yeltsin took note. Honestly, Clinton’s disapprove of someone, was probably a good sign.
In time, Putin would rise to the top. But he never forgot who gave him his start—or whom he owed. To this day, he maintains a close relationship with Sobchak’s family. Sobchak’s widow has said, “If not for Vladimir Vladimirovich, Anatoly, would not be here.’’ On important anniversaries and state occasions, Putin still visits his grave. A monster or a good guy? Or just an interesting human — You decide.
Now, let us turn to the darker side of Vladimir Putin. In the theatre of global politics, accusations fly like arrows—some true, some exaggerated, and some politically convenient. When President Obama and then-president Biden labeled Vladimir Putin a killer, many around the world thought about this famous saying : “Those who live in glass houses shouldn’t throw stones.”
It’s a statement worth pondering. After all, both American leaders have Killed multiple people while they were in power. Let’s not talk about Clinton’s body count or Obama’s indiscriminate drone strikes on cities and countries, or it would feel very shameful to point fingers elsewhere. While no one should excuse the crimes of others to justify their own, hypocrisy in politics is nothing new. Still, this isn’t about comparing sins—this is about confronting the truths behind Putin’s actions, particularly two cases that I find deeply troubling and impossible to forgive.
The first is the murder of journalist Anna Politkovskaya, and the second is the assassination of opposition leader Boris Nemtsov. Anna Politkovskaya was a journalist with Novaya Gazeta, a woman of immense intellect, courage, and integrity. She was known for her opposition to the Second Chechen War and for exposing abuses committed in Chechnya. She took immense personal risk to speak up for those who could not. And while Putin did not start - the Chechnya - problem he certainly inherited it. Unfortunately, Anna found herself embroiled in a brutal and complex conflict—and she paid the ultimate price.
Anna made choices that put her in danger. She entered the Chechen conflict with a strong moral compass, but without seeing the full picture. Like many in Russia and neighboring Georgia, she underestimated the web of foreign involvement in the conflict—especially the role of Western intelligence agencies in supporting separatist factions which we learned about years after. Over time, the extent of this interference has become clearer to many, including those who once opposed the war. Now they know they were wrong on many occasions my good friend a polish Journalist Andrea is one of them. But being wrong never justifies being killed.
There is no excusing her murder. While her death was carried out by Chechens, not Putin, no one doubts that Putin knew about it just like no-one doubts that the killing was sanctioned—by Kadyrov, the Kremlin’s man in Chechnya. And it is simply impossible to believe that Vladimir Putin was unaware.
Why would Putin allow such a thing? To answer that, we need to understand Chechnya itself: a volatile region, historically volatile region. Not every culture is created equal. Chechnya is dangerous and very resistant to control, deeply rooted in tribal and religious traditions, and plagued by corruption and extremism.
For Moscow, Chechnya has always been a headache—even today, one that cannot be amputated without bleeding out. They would gladly give it away if they could. Putin knew he couldn’t change Chechen culture through occupation or ideology. Cultures cannot be changed by force, and in the United States, we know all too well what happens when you try. Our experience in Afghanistan proved this firsthand. Cultural change must come from within not from nation building. It cannot be imposed externally. When force is used, it often causes more harm than good. Taliban once said to the U.S. — “You have the watches, but we have the time.” And they were right—today, the Taliban is back in power in Afghanistan and we achieved nothing. They are the same if not even more closed up in culture than before, what did we achieve? Nothing! So, Putin used a different strategy: replace an uncontrollable wild dog with one loyal to him. And it worked. If I’m going to have an aggressive dog in the heart of my country it better be - my dog so it doesn’t bit my ass off.
Kadyrov — a crazy as he is brought a strange kind of order and Chechnya seemingly is under control. But it came at a cost, and one of those costs was Anna Politkovskaia. In Putin’s defense of the indefensible, his administration did warn her to stop many times. Anna received letters telling her to stop. Obviously when I say that I don’t mean Putins administration itself but she got anonymous letter and it’s not hard to know where it came from. She never did—as she shouldn’t have. I wouldn’t have stopped either. Journalists must do what they need to do. She did a right thing it’s just she did not know the whole truth behind conflict and she certainly did not understand the bigger picture and how complicated Chechnya issue was She ended up inadvertently hurting the country and Putin never forgives that. The second case is equally painful: Boris Nemtsov.
And in this case I would say I don’t have slightest justification possible. A former Deputy Prime Minister under Yeltsin, Nemtsov and Putin were once allies. When Yeltsin chose Putin over Nemtsov as his successor, Nemtsov took it with dignity, even grace. But over time, their paths diverged dramatically. Nemtsov became one of Putin’s loudest critics, organizing protests and aligning himself with pro-Western forces. Unlike others, though, Nemtsov remained a patriot. He loved Russia. He believed in democracy, transparency, and the idea that the West wanted to help Russia. He was wrong of course — he really was but being wrong does not warrant execution.
I respected Nemtsov. I still do. I liked him a lot. His integrity, his love for his country, and his belief in a better Russia were real. What he lacked was an understanding of how geopolitics had evolved—how much of the opposition to Putin was being fueled and funded by foreign interests and NGOs. Yet he remained, in my view, one of the last sincere voices in Russian opposition. He didn’t deserve to die.
Putin is a great strategist, a defender of Russia in a way, I admire his tactics, he is a master of statecraft in many ways. But he has a flaw: he doesn’t know how to turn enemies into friends. His inability to communicate with his opponents, to bring them into the fold instead of pushing them away, has cost Russia dearly—not just morally, but politically. In this way, he loses the information war, again and again. He could have talked to Nemtsov. I believe he could have won him over. They wanted the same thing. But instead, he chose the easy way out. And an easy way - is almost never an honorable way. While none of these killings were proved to be done by Putin, there is little doubt that he knew about it and possibly was behind it.
So, where does that leave us? Is Putin a monster or a patriot? A tyrant or a protector? That’s for history to decide. Personally, I like him—I think Russia needs him. I also believe that if the West changed its stance toward him, Russia and the U.S. could become strong allies against China and other, far more dangerous cultures. Russia could also be more democratic if the US stands with it instead of constantly working against him and forcing Russia into tight control. As I’ve said before, not every culture is created equal, but all should be treated with respect.
One thing is true: No leader, however powerful or effective, has the right to silence people or to kill them